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OPINION OF  THE  COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
We determine whether the operator of two nightclubs 
and a beach club at the Revel casino in Atlantic City, New 
Jersey, may reduce its outstanding rent obligations based on 
“recoupment” payments that the initial owner of the casino—
Revel AC, Inc.—agreed to make under a complex commercial 
lease before it filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  The 
Bankruptcy Court and District Court both held that the 
nightclub operator is permitted to reduce its rental obligations 
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under a tenant-protective provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 
U.S.C. § 365(h), and the doctrine of equitable recoupment.  We 
affirm on both grounds. 
I.  Background 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
When Revel entered Chapter 11 in 2014, one of its 
tenants, plaintiff-appellee IDEA Boardwalk, LLC, continued 
to operate two nightclubs and a beach club on the casino 
premises.  As Revel worked through its bankruptcy, IDEA 
sought to protect its right to continue operating on the casino 
premises under a long-term lease (the “Lease”) by filing an 
adversary proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court.  IDEA initially 
filed against Revel as the owner, but defendant-appellant Polo 
North Country Club, Inc., became the defendant in the 
proceeding (and IDEA’s landlord under the Lease) when it 
purchased Revel’s assets, including the casino, for a small 
fraction of the casino’s building cost per a purchase agreement 
dated March 20, 2015 (the “Purchase Agreement” or 
“Agreement”).  The Bankruptcy Court approved the sale 
shortly thereafter (the “Sale Order”).   
The Purchase Agreement provided that Polo would 
purchase Revel’s assets free and clear of all liabilities except 
for those listed in the Agreement.  As relevant here, it stated 
that Polo’s only surviving liability with respect to the Lease 
would be a potential liability to IDEA for an administrative 
expense claim up to a specified maximum amount.  (Purchase 
Agreement § 2.3(f).)  The Agreement also stated that Polo 
would acquire certain legal claims Revel may have against 
IDEA with respect to the Lease (id. § 2.1(m)), which the 
parties understand to include any rent payments that IDEA may 
still owe under the Lease. 
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The Sale Order generally authorized Polo’s purchase of 
Revel’s assets “free and clear of all liens, claims, 
encumbrances and other interests of any kind” under § 363(f) 
of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 363(f).  (Sale Order ¶ 6.)  
In light of prior litigation concerning the rights of tenants on 
Revel’s properties,1 the Sale Order also contained two carve-
out provisions that expressly preserved certain rights relating 
to IDEA’s continued use of the casino premises under the 
Lease.  The first carve-out preserved “[a]ny rights (including 
rights of setoff and recoupment), claims and defenses of IDEA 
. . . with respect to [IDEA’s adversary proceeding against 
Revel].”  (Id. ¶ 14.)  The second reserved “any rights elected 
to be retained by [IDEA or other tenants] pursuant to section 
365(h) of the Bankruptcy Code” after Revel’s rejection of the 
governing tenancy agreements, including, in IDEA’s case, the 
Lease.  (Id. ¶ 18.) 
The Sale Order’s carve-out of these tenant rights set the 
stage for further litigation between IDEA and Polo concerning 
IDEA’s rights and obligations as Polo’s tenant under the Lease.  
Shortly after entering the Sale Order, the Bankruptcy Court 
granted a long-pending motion by Revel to reject the Lease 
retroactively to September 2, 2014, the date on which the Revel 
casino closed its doors.  In response to that order, IDEA filed a 
notice of its election to retain its rights as a tenant under § 
365(h) of the Code, as expressly allowed by the Sale Order.  
IDEA also asked the Bankruptcy Court to clarify its rights as a 
                                              
1 Polo first tried to purchase Revel’s assets under a sale order 
that would have extinguished IDEA’s possessory rights under 
the Lease.  That order was stayed by our Court in a prior 
decision, see In re Revel AC, Inc., 802 F.3d 558, 575 (3d Cir. 
2015), and superseded by the Sale Order we now review.  
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tenant after Revel’s rejection of the Lease and sale of the casino 
to Polo.  
In an omnibus order in June 2015, the Bankruptcy Court 
clarified major aspects of the post-petition landlord–tenant 
relationship between IDEA and Polo.  That order substantially 
narrowed the litigation between IDEA and Polo but left open 
an important question about the rights IDEA retained under the 
Lease—namely, whether IDEA is permitted to deduct from its 
outstanding rent obligations certain “recoupment” amounts 
owing to IDEA under the Lease.  To seek the Bankruptcy 
Court’s clarification on this point, IDEA filed a motion for 
summary judgment on one of its pending claims in the 
adversary proceeding.  The Bankruptcy Court granted in part 
IDEA’s motion for summary judgment, declaring that:  
(i) IDEA may “offset (against rent) any damages caused, after 
rejection, by [Polo’s] nonperformance” under the Lease; and 
(ii) it may “apply and setoff the Recoupment Amount, as 
defined in the Lease, for both the period prior to [Polo’s] 
acquisition of title and after.”   
The Bankruptcy Court’s ruling that IDEA may reduce 
its rent obligations by the recoupment amounts under the 
Lease, which is the only aspect of the Bankruptcy Court’s 
summary judgment order on appeal, gave two independent 
grounds:  (1) the recoupment provisions of the Lease “fall 
within the ambit of rights preserved under Code 
§ 365(h)(1)(A)(ii),” In re Revel AC, Inc., 2016 WL 6155903, 
at *11 (Bankr. D.N.J. Oct. 21, 2016); and (2) IDEA could 
deduct amounts based on the equitable doctrine of recoupment.  
Id. at *11–12.  Polo appealed to the District Court the 
Bankruptcy Court’s grant of summary judgment, which 
affirmed on the same two grounds.  It now appeals to us.  
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B. The Lease  
The Lease is long and neither simple nor direct.  Indeed 
it is an almost impenetrable web of formulas, defined terms, 
and cross-references—a “bloated morass,” in the words of the 
Bankruptcy Court.  We accordingly do not recite the Lease 
provisions verbatim, but instead summarize its relevant 
provisions, which relate to capital contributions, rent 
obligations, and recoupment obligations.2 
Capital contributions.  The Lease contemplated that 
both Revel and IDEA would make capital contributions to 
“build out” the IDEA venues before opening them.  (Lease 
§ M(a).)  The total budget for this build-out was roughly $80 
million, with Revel responsible for about $48 million and 
IDEA bound for $16 million.  (Id.)  The remaining $16 million 
would either be contributed by IDEA (at IDEA’s option) or by 
Revel if IDEA did not make the contribution.  (Id. § M(b).)  
These capital contributions—and, in particular, the relative 
proportions of capital contributed by IDEA and Revel—were 
the foundation for rent and recoupment calculations under the 
Lease (described below). 
Rent obligations.  The Lease contemplated that IDEA 
would pay rent to Revel each month on a venue-by-venue 
basis.  IDEA’s capital contribution was apportioned among its 
                                              
2 We make one clarification concerning our use of the term 
“recoupment.”  We use “recoupment amounts” to describe 
Revel’s contractual obligation under the Lease to make certain 
recoupment payments because the Lease itself uses the term 
“recoupment.”  However, this contractual obligation is not the 
same as the concept of “equitable recoupment,” which is an 
equitable doctrine from the common law (as we discuss 
below).  
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three venues based on certain percentages specified in the 
Lease.  (Id. Ex. K.)  Then, each month, the rent for a given 
venue was calculated to be the distributable cash flow from that 
venue multiplied by the percentage share of capital contributed 
to that venue by Revel as part of the pre-opening build-out.  
(Id. § C.1(a)(i).)  
Recoupment obligations.  Under the Lease, Revel would 
make certain “recoupment” payments to IDEA in the first four 
years of the Lease term.  These occurred every three months 
for IDEA’s two nightclubs and twice a year for the beach club.  
(Id. § C.1(d)(vi).)  On each of the calculation dates, IDEA and 
Revel would determine (a) whether the venue in question had 
reached a certain threshold in gross sales, and (b) whether it 
had registered a positive return on capital investment, as 
measured by comparing the venue’s year-to-date distributable 
cash flow (as defined in the Lease) to the portion of IDEA’s 
capital contribution allocated to that venue for the time period 
in question using a straight-line depreciation over four years.  
(Id. §§ C.1(a)(i)(1), C.1(d).)  For each of these calculation 
dates, if the venue met the applicable gross-sales threshold but 
did not have a positive return to capital net of depreciation, 
Revel would refund to IDEA the amount necessary to cause the 
latter to break even for that period.  (Id.)  
II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 158(a).  In re Truong, 513 F.3d 91, 93 (3d Cir. 
2008) (per curiam).  We have jurisdiction per 28 U.S.C. 
§ 158(d)(1) and exercise the same standard of review as did 
the District Court.  In re Heritage Highgate, Inc., 679 F.3d 
132, 139 (3d Cir. 2012).  It reviewed the Bankruptcy Court’s 
grant of summary judgment de novo.  See In re Klaas, 858 
F.3d 820, 827 (3d Cir. 2017).  We do the same. 
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III.  Discussion 
The Bankruptcy Court and the District Court both ruled 
that IDEA has a right to reduce its rent obligations to Polo by 
the amount of Polo’s recoupment obligations under the Lease.  
Both Courts based this ruling on two independent grounds:  
First, the tenant rights that IDEA retained by making an 
election under § 365(h) of the Bankruptcy Code include the 
right to reduce its rent obligations by the recoupment amounts.  
Second, even if § 365(h) did not extend to the recoupment 
amounts, IDEA would be permitted to reduce its rent 
obligations under the doctrine of equitable recoupment.  
A. Section 365(h) Election 
Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code governs a debtor’s 
rejection of executory contracts and unexpired leases during 
bankruptcy.  Subsection (h) protects a tenant whose landlord 
files for bankruptcy and then rejects the tenant’s lease.  In 
relevant part, it provides that  
[i]f the trustee[3] rejects an unexpired lease of real 
property under which the debtor is the lessor . . . 
[and] the term of such lease has commenced, the 
lessee may retain its rights under such lease 
(including rights such as those relating to the 
amount and timing of payment of rent and other 
amounts payable by the lessee and any right of 
use, possession, quiet enjoyment, subletting, 
assignment, or hypothecation) that are in or 
                                              
3 With narrow exceptions not relevant here, rights and powers 
given to a trustee under Chapter 11 of the Code may be 
exercised as well by a debtor in possession (here Revel, as the 
debtor) when no trustee is appointed for the debtor’s estate.  
See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a).  
Case: 17-3607     Document: 003113098413     Page: 8      Date Filed: 11/30/2018
9 
 
appurtenant to the real property for the balance 
of the term of such lease . . . .  
11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1)(A)(ii).   
In the Sale Order approving Revel’s sale of assets to 
Polo, the Bankruptcy Court expressly preserved “any rights 
elected to be retained by [IDEA or other tenants] pursuant to 
section 365(h) of the Bankruptcy Code” after the debtor’s 
rejection of the governing tenancy agreements, including the 
Lease.  (Sale Order ¶ 18.)  And IDEA preserved those rights 
by making an election under § 365(h) when the Bankruptcy 
Court approved Revel’s motion to reject the Lease. 
Under subsection (h), the rights IDEA reserved under 
the Lease include those “relating to the amount and timing of 
payment of rent and other amounts payable by the lessee.”  
11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1)(A)(ii).  As we have explained 
previously, a tenant who makes an election under this 
provision is “entitled to remain under the same rental terms as 
are set forth in the lease.”  Megafoods Stores, Inc. v. Flagstaff 
Realty Assocs. (In re Flagstaff Realty Assocs.), 60 F.3d 1031, 
1034 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting In re TM Carlton House 
Partners, 97 B.R. 819, 823 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989)).   
There is no doubt the “rental terms” under which IDEA 
leased the venue premises include the right to receive 
recoupment payments under the Lease.  Although it contains 
distinct provisions addressing “rent” and “recoupment,” they 
are inextricably related and combine to establish IDEA’s rental 
terms under the Lease.  In their net effect, the rent and 
recoupment provisions ensured that IDEA would pay rent in 
the first four years of the Lease term only when an IDEA venue 
turned a profit (as measured by the year-to-date distributable 
cash flow from the venue and accounting for the depreciation 
of capital that IDEA contributed to that venue).  To render the 
Case: 17-3607     Document: 003113098413     Page: 9      Date Filed: 11/30/2018
10 
 
“recoupment” component of this framework inoperative, while 
still calculating the “rent” component using the same formulas, 
would upend the rent framework established in the Lease and 
deny IDEA’s statutory right to remain in possession of the 
premises under the same “rental terms.”  Flagstaff, 60 F.3d at 
1035.  Accordingly, by virtue of its election under § 365(h), 
IDEA is permitted to reduce its rent obligations by the 
recoupment amounts applicable under the Lease for the 
balance of the term of the Lease after the date of rejection—
i.e., after September 2, 2014.4 
B. Equitable Recoupment 
The doctrine of equitable recoupment “is not codified 
in the Bankruptcy Code, but has been established through 
decisional law.”  In re Anes, 195 F.3d 177, 182 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(quoting Flagstaff, 60 F.3d at 1035).  When a claim against a 
debtor qualifies for equitable recoupment, the claim “avoids 
the usual bankruptcy channels,” in that it receives full value in 
the netting of obligations between a creditor and the debtor 
without regard to the bankruptcy priority of the claim—“thus, 
in essence, [the claim] is given priority over other creditors’ 
                                              
4 We note that, in addition to the general tenant protections in 
§ 365(h)(1)(A)(ii), another provision addresses a tenant’s right 
to reduce its rent obligations under a rejected lease based on 
the landlord’s nonperformance of its obligations under the 
lease after the rejection.  See 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1)(B).  
Although we need not rest our decision on this particular 
provision, we note that it appears to provide another basis on 
which IDEA could reduce its rent obligations based on the 
recoupment amounts under the Lease, assuming, as the record 
suggests, that Revel ceased to perform its recoupment 
obligations after moving to reject the Lease.  
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claims.”  Flagstaff, 60 F.3d at 1035; see also In re Anes, 195 
F.3d at 181–82 (discussing equitable recoupment).5 
Recoupment means “the setting up of a demand arising 
from the same transaction as the plaintiff’s claim or cause of 
action, strictly for the purpose of abatement or reduction of 
such claim.”  In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d 1065, 1079 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (quoting 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 553.03, at 
553-15 to -17 (emphasis added by Univ. Med. Ctr.)).  For 
purposes of equitable recoupment, “a mere logical relationship 
is not enough:  the ‘fact that the same two parties are involved, 
and that a similar subject matter gave rise to both claims, . . . 
does not mean that the two arose from the same transaction.’”  
Id. at 1081 (quoting Lee v. Schweiker, 739 F.2d 870, 875 (3d 
Cir. 1984)).  “Rather, both debts must arise out of a single 
integrated transaction so that it would be inequitable for the 
debtor to enjoy the benefits of that transaction without also 
meeting its obligations.”  Id.  
IDEA contends that the doctrine of equitable 
recoupment requires reducing its existing rent obligations by 
Polo’s recoupment obligations.  We agree.  As summarized 
above, the rent and recoupment provisions created a rental 
framework that ensured IDEA would pay rent in the first four 
years of the Lease term only when a venue made profit as 
measured by a formula set out in the Lease.  To give effect to 
this framework, the recoupment provisions of the Lease 
performed a periodic downward adjustment to IDEA’s rent 
obligations under the Lease.  Given this countervailing relation 
between the rent obligations and recoupment amounts under 
                                              
5 For this reason, we have pointed out that equitable 
recoupment, “as a non-statutory, equitable exception to the 
automatic stay, should be narrowly construed.”  In re Univ. 
Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d 1065, 1081 (3d Cir. 1992).  
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the Lease, there is no question the rental obligations and 
recoupment amounts “aris[e] from the same transaction,” Univ. 
Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1079 (citation and emphasis omitted), 
for purposes of equitable recoupment.  In this context, we also 
have no trouble concluding it would be inequitable to require 
IDEA to pay the full amount of its rental obligations without 
applying the countervailing downward adjustments 
contemplated by the recoupment provisions.  See Flagstaff, 60 
F.3d at 1035 (ruling that tenant could reduce its rent under the 
doctrine of equitable recoupment based on the cost of making 
repairs the bankrupt landlord was obligated to make, because 
“[b]oth the claim for repair costs and the rent arise from the 
lease, and it would be inequitable for the landlord to receive 
rent without compensating [the] tenant for undertaking 
repairs”). 
That Polo obtained Revel’s assets “free and clear of all 
liens, claims, encumbrances and other interests of any kind” in 
a sale under Code § 363(f) does not change the result.  The Sale 
Order expressly preserved “[a]ny rights (including rights of 
setoff and recoupment), claims and defenses of IDEA . . . with 
respect to [IDEA’s adversary proceeding against Revel].”  
(Sale Order ¶ 14.)  That preserved IDEA’s assertion of 
equitable recoupment here.  Further, as we have explained in 
prior cases, the doctrine of equitable recoupment is an 
affirmative defense, and the sale of assets “free and clear” of 
liens, encumbrances, and interests “does not include defenses 
to claims.”  Folger Adam Sec., Inc. v. DeMatteis/MacGregor, 
JV, 209 F.3d 252, 257, 258–64 (3d Cir. 2000); accord In re 
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 322 F.3d 283, 289 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(“[A] right of recoupment is a defense and not an interest and 
therefore is not extinguished by a § 363(f) sale.” (quoting 
Folger, 209 F.3d at 261)).  
In short, IDEA is entitled to reduce its rent obligations 
by the recoupment amounts under the Lease based on the 
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doctrine of equitable recoupment.  We also clarify that 
equitable recoupment applies to rent and recoupment amounts 
under the Lease regardless whether they arose before or after 
Revel filed its bankruptcy petition and regardless whether they 
arose before or after Revel rejected the Lease.6 
* * * * * 
When IDEA agreed to operate two nightclubs and a 
beach club at the Revel casino, it agreed under the Lease to pay 
rent only when its venues met certain financial benchmarks.  
Section 365(h) of the Bankruptcy Code and the doctrine of 
equitable recoupment entitled IDEA to continue paying rent on 
those same terms even after its landlord filed for bankruptcy 
and rejected the Lease.  Nothing in the agreements or court 
orders governing third-party Polo’s purchase of the casino in 
bankruptcy changes this result.  We therefore affirm, holding 
that IDEA may reduce its rent obligations by the recoupment 
amounts provided under the Lease.  
 
                                              
6 For the avoidance of any doubt, we do not hold that IDEA is 
entitled to recover affirmatively any recoupment amount from 
Polo.  Rather, IDEA’s rights under § 365(h) and the equitable 
recoupment doctrine are limited to giving IDEA the right to 
reduce its rent obligations to Polo.  Nothing in this opinion 
should be construed to allow IDEA to recover any additional 
monies from Polo (such as for the recoupment of capital 
contributions) beyond the reduction of rent that IDEA owes to 
Polo under the Lease. 
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